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THE MANAGEMENT OF AIR QUALITY:
LEGAL STRUCTURES AND OFFICIAL BEHAVIOR
PAUL GOLDSTEIN"

and ROBERT FoRDt

T

he study upon which this article is based consists of an integrated model of the federal, state and county laws which,
by their terms, are intended to regulate the management of air
quality in a selected area in Western New York, and of a report, based upon structured and unstructured interviews and re-

view of agency records, of the official behavior of the state and
county personnel charged under these laws with respon-

sibility for management of air quality within -the area. The article describes two regulatory models, the first, "legal," the second,
"real," and compares the requirements and expectations of the
first with the workings of the second. In this it touches on
two eminently current concerns: the widespread concern that
the national environment is not being managed as rationally
as it could be, and the more specialized concern that students of
administrative law have for too long occupied themselves with
questions at the tip of their subject's iceberg-questions, for
example, of delegation and scope of judicial review-and neglected.
the question at its bulk-how administrative bodies behave.'
In terms of -the certainty and continuing value of its conclusions, the study was initially troubled by the marked transcience of air quality legislation: over the study's one year
course, the relevant federal legal structures were significantly
altered twice and the state legal structures once, and there is
0 Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo, Faculty
of Law and Jurisprudence. A.B., Brandeis University, 1964; LL.B., Columbia University, 1967.
t Lecturer in Sociology, State University of New York at Buffalo. B.A., Niagara
University, 1965; M.A., University of Illinois, 1969.
The study on which this article is based was conducted under a grant from the
Council on Law-Related Studies. The article benefited from the wise suggestions of
the Council's President, Mr. David F. Cavers and of Professors Marc Galanter and
Robert Kidder.
1. K. DAvis, DiscREIoNARY JUsTIcE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969); Johnson, Book
Review, The Second Half of Jurisprudence: The Study of Administrative Decisionmaking, 23 STAN. L. REv. 173 (1970); cf. H. JONEs, THE EFFICACY OF LAW (1969);
Gifford, Communication of Legal Standards, Policy Development, and Effective Conduct
Regulation, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 409 (1971).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

little doubt that the coming years will witness further adjustments at all legislative levels. Yet, two of the study's findings suggest that, so long as legislative developments incline in their present direction, they will not detract from the study's continuing
value. The first finding isolated the paradigm which informs all
law revision in the field, a paradigm for the alignment of air
quality management tasks between the different levels of government responsible for their discharge. Under the original pattern
of governmental allocation, counties and other institutions of local
government in New York were charged with primary responsibility for air quality management. Subsequently, the state withdrew some of this responsibility to itself - and later was charged
by the federal governmefit with additional responsibility., It appears that under the emerging trend, the federal government will
increasingly withdraw authority from the state and the state will
increasingly withdraw authority from the counties.4
Second, inquiry into the behavior of officials who are charged
with administering these laws and who will, most likely, continue
in charge of management under the emerging legislative trends,
revealed that so long as law revision continues to be structured
in terms of this paradigm it will have little discernible
effect upon the conduct of air quality regulation in the region.
Simply, the observed patterns of official behavior possess a life
of their own, one which is largely insulated from statutory change
within the presently conceived framework. The general conclusion
from this, that within the current framework *of law revision

-

2. N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAi art. 12-A (McKinney 1971).
3. Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485, codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857 et seq. (Supp. V, 1970).
4. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, amending 42
U.S.C. § 1857 (1969) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857 (Supp. May, 1971)). Buffalo Evening News, Sept. 25, 1971, at 17, col. 5. A related and equally significant trend involves
the formation of a single agency at any level of government from a number of agencies
charged with different environmental tasks. This has been accomplished at the federal
level through the assembly, in the Environmental Protection Agency, of functions previously vested in separate divisions of the Departments of Agriculture, Interior and Health,
Education and Welfare and of the Federal Radiation Council and the Atomic Energy
Commission. It has in New York been achieved through the transfer to the newlycreated Environmental Conservation Department of the environmental functions formerly
lodged in the Agriculture and Markets, Conservation and Health Departments and the
Natural Beauty and Water Resources Commissions.
2,
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alterations in legal rules are without material consequence, is the
basis for some more specific conclusions respecting the structure
of the types of law reform necessary to effect change. Part I of
this article describes the present legal structures which are intended to affect air quality management in the two-county area; 5
the 1967 Air Quality Act, which was in effect throughout the
period of this study, provides the starting point for this inventory. Parts II and III identify the patterns of official conduct which
obtain in the region, and part IV reviews the 1970 amendments
to the Act and suggests the types of legal structures which can
be effective in altering official conduct.6
I. LEGAL STRUCTURES

Two related concepts, air quality criteria and air quality
control regions, form the basis for the 1967 federal Air Quality
Act's allocation among federal, state and local governments of
authority for the prescription and enforcement of air quality
standards. Air quality criteria represent scientific evaluations
of the threats to person and property posed by any contaminant
or combination of contaminants. Air quality control regions represent the geographic loci for application of these criteria. For
every federally designated air quality region within their borders,
states are to derive from the federally established criteria air
5. The legal structures described relate exclusively to the regulation of emissions
from stationary, privately controlled sources; mobile and government controlled sources
and the disbursement of grants and application of fiscal incentives fall outside the

study's scope.
6. The field phase of this study, which provided the data for parts II and III,
was conducted over a nine-month period and consisted of three stages. First, for purposes
of orientation, the researchers conducted a series of preliminary, broad-gauged interviews with a small number of representatives from the three enforcement agencies involved in the study and from affected industries. Second, separate interview schedules.
for agencies and industries were drafted. These schedules formed the basis for interviews with all members of the three agencies possessing prescription or enforcement
authority and with their responsible counterparts in thirty industrial firms which aresubject to the agencies' jurisdiction and which were selected to form a broad spectrumin terms of size and emission amount and type. The interviews were conducted by
"elite interviewers" and, through probes, were extended beyond the literal confines of
the interview schedule. At the same time, the researchers conducted full-day observations of enforcement personnel working in the field and reviewed pertinent literature
and records maintained by the agencies. Third, the researchers conducted a series of
follow-up interviews with legal counsel to the agencies on specific questions of law"
enforcement.
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quality standards which prescribe the allowable concentrations of
contaminants in the region's airy Air quality standards are, in
turn, to be employed in the prescription of emission control
standards which define the extent to which every contaminant
source within the region must curtail its emissions in order for
the overall level prescribed by the standard to be reached.
The Act thus charges the federal government with the
development of air quality criteria and the designation of air
quality control regions,8 and the states with the prescription
under the criteria of air quality and emission control standards
for each region in the state, and with the enforcement of the
standards within each region.9 In chronological terms, the Act
envisions phased state and federal action. First, the federal government, through the Environmental Protection Agency, designates atmospheric areas across the nation; 1 next, the Environmental Protection Agency designates air quality control regions within each atmospheric area.11 Concurrently, the Agency
develops air quality criteria for specific contaminants and techniques for bringing emissions to the levels identified by the
criteria.n Once developed, the criteria and associated control
techniques are published and communicated by the Agency to
the governor of every state which contains an air quality control
region. Within ninety days after receipt of the criteria and recommended control techniques, the governor is to file with the
Agency a representation that his state will within 180 days adopt,
for each specified contaminant, ambient air quality standards
for all air quality control regions within the state and, within 180
days after that, adopt a plan for the implementation, maintenance
and enforcement of the prescribed ambient air standards7.

See generally, STAFF

COMM. ON

PUBLIC WORKS,

OF SUBCOMM. ON AIR AND WATER POLLUTION OF THE SENATE
90TH CONG., 2D SEss., AIR QUALITY CRITERIA (Comm. Print

1968).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2 (Supp. V, 1970).
9. Id. § 1857d. The extent to which this basic allocation of responsibility has
been shifted under the Clean Air Amendments is indicated at pp. 46-47, infra. Some of
the reasons given for this shift appear in H.R. REp. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2 (a) (1) (Supp V, 1970).

11. Id. § 1857c-2 (a) (2).
12. Id. § 1857c-2 (b) &(c).
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essentially a plan for the application of emission control standards."3
New ,York's air quality legislation, 14 though enacted a decade
before passage of the federal act, substantially comports with this
federal allocation. The legislation gives the state's Environmental
Conservation Department complete authority to prescribe and enforce air quality standards for all contaminants emitted from
stationary sources. Though plenary, the state authority is not preemptive: the state act permits counties and municipalities to exercise a full range of prescription and enforcement techniques within their respective jurisdictions. The two counties, Erie and
Niagara, which are the subject of this study have responded to this
state permission differently. Niagara County enforces the state
standards exclusively. Erie County, though it, too, espouses the
state program, has promulgated its own standards for several contaminants and enforces these on the same basis as it does the state
standards.
A. The Regional Scheme
As characterized by the federal act, the nation's air pollution problem consists of a drastic increase in four factors:
urbanization, the complexity and amount of contaminants, the
complexity and amount of their sources, and the threat posed by
13. Id. § 1857d (c) (1).
The achievement of the established ambient air quality standards is contingent
upon the application of meaningful emission controls on the various sources
of air pollution, within a given air quality control region.
Such emission controls are established for the purposes of achieving specific
air quality standards. They may include such alternative courses of action as
process changes, flue gas stack controls, stack height requirements, fuel use limitations, or plant location rules, but in any event should include the best
available technology required to achieve the desired level of ambient air quality.
SENATE COMM. ON PUtLic WORKs, REPORT ON S. 780, S. REP. No. 403, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 29 (1967).
If each of these steps is followed, and if the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency determines that the standards submitted by the states comport with
the criteria and the control techniques and that the enforcement plan is consistent with
the purposes of the Act, the standards and plan "shall be the air quality standards
applicable to such State." 42 U.S.C. § 1857d (c) (1) (Supp. V, 1970). It is for instances
in which the state fails to meet one of these steps, or to provide adequate standards
or sufficient enforcement procedures or actions that the Administrator is given responsibility for the direct prescription and enforcement of standards. Id. § 1857d (c) - (k).

14. N.Y. PuB.

HEALTm LAW

art. 12-A (McKinney 1971).

5
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these contaminants to life and property.15 The latter three
factors-types, sources and effects of contaminants-are recurrent,
and in that sense uniform, throughout the nation. It was the
first factor, urbanization, which recommended application of
a regional technique to management of the nation's air quality.
Since air contamination is grossly attributable to human activity, contaminant emissions tend to increase relative to population increases; emissions, though subject to some dispersion, tend
to cluster in the atmosphere over the regions from which they
derive so that their effects are largely confined to the urban
population responsible for their discharge." Though these contaminant clusters are never entirely discrete, it is possible under
present technology to identify regional boundaries which include
most of the contaminant sources in an urban area as well as most
of the population and property affected by the contaminants
emitted from these sources.
The first step in the federal program's regional designation
process is determination of the nation's atmospheric areasbroad areas within which meteorological conditions affecting the
concentration and diffusion of air contaminants are roughly consistent. 17 The second step, identification of particular regions
within a' broad atmospheric area, is intended to be responsive
both to "engineering" factors-geographic patterns of contaminant emission concentrations, for example-and "social" and
"political" factors-projected population densities and patterns
§ 1857"(a). The Congress finds(1) that the predominant part of the Nation's population is located in rapidly
expanding metropolitan and other urban areas, which generally cross the boundary lines of local jurisdictions and often extend into two or more States;
(2) that the growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution brought
about by urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing use of motor
vehicles, has resulted in mounting dngers to the public health and welfare,
including injury to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and the detcrioration of property, and hazards to air and ground transportation....
16. A survey based upon the 1960 census indicated the existence of major air contamination problems in 308 urban plates, an increase of 84 over the number ten years
-earlier. STAFF OF SENATE Comm,. ON PUBLIC WVORKs, 88TIl CONG., IST SESS., A STUDY
•oF POLLUTION-Am (Comm. Print 1963).
17. The eight atmospheric areas identified at the time this study was undertaken
cover the nation's 48 contiguous states. For a brief description of the designation process
and a map delineating the atmospheric areas see, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION
AND WELFARE, FIRST REPORT, PROGRESS IN THE PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF AIR POLLUTION,
S. Doe. No. 92, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1968).
15.
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of cooperative effort among political units within a given, area,
for example."'
A review of the engineering, political and social factors
which were adduced in support of the designation of Erie and
Niagara Counties as a single air quality control region will
illustrate how the initial phases of the federal regional designation are intended to operate. The first step in the process of
delineating an air quality control region-identification of a
general atmospheric area-was completed with designation of the
so-called Great Lakes-Northeast Area. Under the -next step, a
Buffalo metropolitan area, consisting of Niagara, Erie, Orleans,
Genesee, Wyoming, Chautauqua and Cattaraugus Counties,
was identified within the general atmospheric area. In the final
engineering step, tentative boundaries were developed and
employed to define the initial outlines for an air quality control region-in this case, roughly the region formed by Erie and
Niagara Counties. 9
18. For a description of one widely-employed technique, diffusion modeling, see
id. at 7, 66-67.
Though not in so many words, the 1970 Clean Air Amendments abandon the refined,
analytic methodology which ostensibly formed the basis for designations under the
1967 Act. Section 107, as amended, retains its regional approach but provides that any
portion of a state not already declared a region, or not so designated within 90 days
of the amendment's effective date, "shall be an air quality control region, but such
portion may be subdivided by State into two or more air quality control regions with
the approval of the Administrator." Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 117 (b) (2),- 84 Stat. 1676,
codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-2 (b) (2) (Supp. May, 1971).
The House Report accompanying the bill to amend adduces some reasons for the
change:
Under the present law, the Secretary is directed to establish air quality, control regions but only a few such regions have 'been established thus far. Consequently, actual air pollution enforcement activities have been delayed excessively. Additionally, the proposed regions are not contiguous and, therefore, do
not cover the entire United States.
By making each State area an air quality region, the time consumed in establishing such region on a selective basis will be saved. By dividing the entire United
States into contiguous air quality regions, the war against pollution will be
carried into every part of the United States.
H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970).
19. In terms of internal dispersion of the contaminant load, it was observed that
contaminants travel long distances within the two-county area-from the City of Niagara
Falls to Buffalo, for example. N.Y. Am POLLUTION -CONTROL BOARD, AIR POLLUTION IN
ERIE COUNTY, CONIPREHENSIVE AREA SuRvEY, REPORT No. 2 (1963); N.Y. AIR POLLUTION
CONTROL BOAnD, A REvmw oF Am POLLUTION IN NEW Yoa STATE (1958). Estimates based

upon meteorological and topographical factors, an emissions inventory and other air
quality information indicated that dispersions into the surrounding counties from the
two-county region were negligible:
The engineering evaluation for the Buffalo area was based on a study of topography, pollutant emissions, estimated air quality levels and available ambient
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These boundaries were then refined by the consideration
of urban factors. Two of the several urban factors considered,
present and projected rates of population and industrial growth,
indicated that in terms both of population density and industrial activity Erie and Niagara Counties were notably more
concentrated than the other five counties in the Buffalo metropolitan area.20 On the basis of a number of political factorsamong them, location of jurisdictional boundaries, existence of
cooperative arrangements between the counties which form the
area and the area's conformity with the boundaries of existing
state and local programs2 -it was reportedly concluded that
air quality data. The emission inventory indicated the location of point and
area sources, the quantity of pollutants emitted from these sources, and the
resulting emission densities. This information was combined with meteorological
data and used in a diffusion model to estimate air quality levels in the Buffalo
area. The estimated air quality information was supplemented by measured air
quality data whenever available.
HEW,
(1969).

REPORT

FOR CONSULTATION

ON

THE BUFFALO AIR QUALITY

CONTROL

REGION 18

The emissions inventory and the air quality information are important indicators of how large a region must be in order to contain all of the major techni-

cal elements of the air pollution problem. From the above analysis, it appears
that Erie and Niagara Counties should be included in the Buffalo Region,

while surrounding counties in the United States should be excluded since they
are not closely linked to the Buffalo air pollution problem. Since the scope
of this report included only areas under the jurisdiction of the United States,
and since the-emissions inventory did not contain pollution sources in Canada,
this analysis has not attempted to evaluate the extent of pollution crossing
the international boundary.
Id. at 35.
20. Of the 1,700,000 residents of the seven-county area, approximately two-thirds
reside in Erie County and a large number of the remainder live in Niagara County.
Population projections for the period, 1968-80, demonstrated for distribution to be an
extended one: projected growth for Erie County is 110 additional residents per square
mile and for Niagara County is 53 additional residents per square mile. The other
five counties are expected to experience an addition of 24 or fewer residents per square
mile over the same period. In Erie County in 1963, 118 persons per square mile were
employed by manufacturing firms; 73 per square mile were employed in Niagara County.
In adjacent counties 18 or fewer persons per square mile were employed by manufacturing
activity. Id. at 12-15.
21. The air pollution control program of the State of New York has an annual
budget of approximately $3,500,000. The State statutes authorize local air pollution control programs to exercise joint jurisdiction at the local level. The
air pollution control program of Erie County has an annual budget of about
$340,000 and Niagara County about $80,000. None of the other counties in the
area has a program of comparable size. The Erie and Niagara programs have
not established any joint activities such as joint air quality measurement, joint
technical facilities, or joint enforcement of air pollution regulations. However,
the two programs do maintain informal contact. Furthermore the programs maintain informal contact with their counterpart in Canada, the air pollution control
program of Ontario. The Erie and Niagara Counties Regional Planning Board
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an Erie-Niagara County region would most closely meet the
statute's requirement that the regional boundaries chosen should,
to the extent possible, enhance governmental cooperation in
management of the area's air resource. 22
Like the federal act, New York's Air Pollution Control
Act clearly mandates that air quality standards accommodate the
contours of regional problems rather than any goal of statewide
or national uniformity. The Act requires generally that topographic, demographic and industrial differences between areas
of the state be identified and made the basis for differentiation
among air quality standards for the same contaminant; 23 in exercising its primary responsibility to develop a comprehensive
plan for the control of air contamination in the state, the State
Environmental Board is charged to account for the "varying
requirements of different areas of the state."2 4 The Board is auconducts regional planning functions for the two-county area. It has a budget of
about $400,000 and produces plans related to land use, transportation, and other
urban services.
Id. at 15-17.
22. Evaluation of engineering and urban factors produces a preliminary delineation of the region's boundaries. The effective boundaries are determined and
published only after completion of the consultation phase, the purpose of which 'is
to give officials of affected state and local governments the opportunity to comment
on the proposed boundaries and to suggest appropriate inclusions or exclusions, See,
e.g., announcement of the proposed boundaries for the Niagara Frontier Region, 34 Fed.
Reg. 2053 (1969).
Though the consultation, as mandated by the Act, is to be exclusively with state
and local authorities, it has been suggested that the consultation structure allows for
the informal presentation of industry views:
Industry also has a vital interest in the boundaries of the air quality control
regions. In appropriate cases it should seek to be heard by the appropriate
state and local officials, as well as by HEW, as to whether a particular area
should be included in the region. It is suggested that local and state officials
be asked for information on the recommended boundaries of air quality regions
and if industry is affected by such boundaries any comments or representation
may be made at that time.
Martin & Symington, A Guide to the Air Quality Act of 1967, 33 LAwi & CONTEMP. PROB.
239, 245 (1968).
23. 10 N.Y. Or'riciAL COMPILATION OF CoDEs, RULES AND REGULATIONS-§ 501.2(b) &
(c) (1968). See generally Governor'sMessage, N.Y. STATE LEGISLATIvE ANNUIAL 436 (1957).
24. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 1271 (2) (a) (McKinney 1971). See also id. § 1276
(4):
Mhe board shall give due recognition to the fact that the quantity
or characteristics of air contaminants or the duration of their presence in the
atmosphere, which may cause air pollution in one area of the state, may cause
less air pollution or not cause any air pollution in another area of the state,
and it shall take into consideration in this connection such factors, among others
found by it to be proper and just, as existing physical conditions, zoning
classifications, topography and prevailing wind directions and velocities and also
the fact that a code, rule or regulation and the degree of conformance there-
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thorized to divide the state into areas and to prescribe for each
area ambient air quality standards, emission standards, fuel composition standards and requirements and standards for the approval

of plans

for air cleaning

installations.2

Any code,

rule or regulation adopted by the Board "may differ in its terms
and provisions as between particular types and conditions of air
pollution or of air contamination; as between particular air
contamination sources; and as between particular areas of the
state." 26 The significance of the area designation is underlined
by the requirement that any action taken by the Board be
preceded by a public hearing within the area of the state affected.

27

These state area designations, like the federal regional designations, are to be based upon an evaluation of local social and
economic patterns as well as topographical and meteorological
variations. 2

The state area designation differs from the federal

regional designation in its distinction among areas on the basis
of five general levels of air contamination, levels which correspond with degrees of population density and economic development. The levels range from (I)-sparsely inhabited areas predominantly used for agriculture-to (V)-extensively industrialized areas, as Erie and Niagara Counties. 2 Five air quality
with which may be proper to an essentially residential area of the state may
not be proper as to a highly developed industrial area of the state.
The New York Environmental Conservation Law is notably oblique in its treatment of the transfer of authority from the Air Pollution Control Board. Though it
abolishes the Board, it nowhere identifies which institution is to assume its responsi.
bility, nor does it specify the extent to which the rules governing the Board's operation,
set forth in sections 1268-76 of the Public Health Law, are to continue in force. The
assumptions underlying this section are that the Board's functions will be transferred
to the Commissioner of Environmental Conservation and to the State Environmental Conservation Law sections 14, 15 and 100-06, and that, to the extent that they are consistent
with the scheme of the 1970 law, the rules governing the Air Pollution Control Board,
and the codes and regulations adopted under them remain in effect.
25. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1271 (1) (b) (McKinney 1971).
26. Id. § 1276 (3).
27. Id. § 1276(2).
28. 10 N. Y. OFFICIAL COMPILATION OF CODES, RULES AND REGULATIONs § 501.2 (b) &(c)
(1968).
29. The regulation premises its use of the five-level approach upon the recognition
that "it is illogical to attempt one over-all set of air quality standards to apply to the entire State. It cannot be expected that air in a clean area-such as the Adirondack Mountains-would be degraded to a level that is reasonably attainable in an extensive area of
heavy industry. Nor would it be reasonable to expect a highly industrialized area to at.
tain economically the level of air quality prevailing in the presently clean areas." Id.
§ 501.2 (c).
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standards are assigned to any single contaminant, one standard
for each air contamination levelV0 The contaminant standards
applied to any area in the state are thus intended to represent an
accommodation of the competing interests in maintaining the
integrity of health and property and in sustaining and encouraging
economic development.3 1
B. The Prescriptionof Standards

Authority to prescribe air quality criteria, air quality
standards and emission standards is distributed among federal,
state and county governments. The federal government is, through
the Environmental Protection Agency, responsible for formulating air quality criteria. These criteria are, in turn, to form the
bases for the promulgation by New York State and by Erie and
Niagara Counties, first, of air quality standards and, subsequently,
of emission control standards for each of the contaminants identified by the federal criteria.2 At the state level, the Department of
Environmental Conservation is authorized to promulgate air
quality and emission standards; 33 at the county level, in Erie and
30. In some cases, particularly where the toxicity of the subject contaminant is
extreme, one maximum allowable concentration is prescribed regardless of the applicable
level. E.g., 10 N.Y. OFFICIAL COMPILATION OF CODES, RULES AND REGULATIONS § 501.2 (e)
(1968).
31. The New York Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations, title 10,
chapter iv, subchapter A provides emissions standards for specific industries as, for examples, cement and lightweight aggregate industry pyroprocesses (part 195); ferrous
jobbing foundries (part 188); by-product coke plants (part 189). It also provides standards and requirements for the control of more general sources, as open fires and smoke
(parts 190 & 191).
Part 201 prescribes standards for the composition and use of fuel for heat and power
generation, and part 200 sets special, more stringent requirements for fuel composition
and use in the New York City metropolitan area.
32. The Environmental Protection Agency is, under the 1970 Clean Air Amendments,
given the authority to promulgate, in addition to air quality criteria, ambient air quality
standards and, in certain instances, emission control standards. Pub. L. No. 91-604,
§§ 109-12, 84 Stat. 1676, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (Supp. V, 1970) (codified at
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1857c-4 through 1857c-7 (Supp. May, 1971)).
3. Under an earlier method of organization in the State, air quality management was made the responsibility of the State Department of Health and its subordinate
regional and district health areas. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAv §§ 240-43, 1268, 1271 (McKinney 1971). The 1970 Environmental Conservation Law at least nominally altered
this basic design by transferring the Health Department's air quality control functions
to the newly-created Department of Environmental Conservation and its Environmental
Control Board. N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERV. L w §§ 77, 78 (McKinney 1970).

11
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Niagara Counties, responsibility for these two tasks is vested in
the county health departments. 34
Under its "Ambient Air Quality Standards-Classification
System," the state Environmental Control Board has established
a broad range of ambient air quality standards and has provided
for their differential application to areas throughout the state."
These ambient air quality standards become, in turn, involved
in the prescription of environmental ratings for all emission
sources within the state.30 Environmental ratings, which are to
form the primary basis for emission control standards applied
to individual sources, are intended to account for the properties
and quantities of contaminants emitted from any source, for
their effects on human, animal or plant life or on property,
for meteorological conditions, stack heights, and community
characteristics along with, in every case, the ambient air quality
classification of the area in which the source is located or which it
affects. 37 The four environmental ratings employed by the Board
are A, B, C, and D, with A representing the most harmful range
of effects attributable to an emission source, and D the least
harmful.38 The level of emission controls required of any contaminant source is directly related to the environmental rating
assigned to it. Sources with an "A" environmental rating are given
34. County governments commonly vest the air quality control function in boards
of health. Though these are largely autonomous of the State Health Department, the
general rules for their establishment and governance are prescribed by the Public
Health Law, and their orders are subject to review and, if ultra vires, to modification
or annulment by the State Commissioner. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW art 3, tits. I-III
(McKinney 1971).
35. Like the federally-prescribed air quality criteria, the state's ambient air quality standards are, in a fundamental sense, descriptive and "describe a level of air quality
designed to protect people from the adverse effects of air pollution ... ." 10 N.Y. OFFICIAL
COMPILATiON OF ConEs, RULES AND REGULATIONS § 501.1 (1968). They are also normative and "are intended further to promote maximum comfort and enjoyment ... consistent with the economic and social well-being of the community." Id. See also id. § 501.2:
Basis of ambient air quality standards. (a) The degree of air purity required
may depend on the effect on any or all of the following receptors: man,
animals, vegetation and property. This is especially so, for example, with some
of the pollutants, such as fluorides, which not only damage vegetation, but
also may build up in forage crops concentrations toxic to grazing ruminants.
When protection of human health is of concern, the standards must be set
so as to assure no adverse effects. Othenvise, standards in whole or in part
must be based on the potential effects on susceptible receptors and accepted
for potential land uses.
36. Id. pt. 187.
37. Id. § 187.2 (a).
38. Id. app. 2, tables 1-4.
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the most stringent emission control standards and those with a
"D" rating the least stringent.3 9
The state act supersedes local-county, city, town or village-laws, ordinances or regulations which are inconsistent with
it or with the codes, rules or regulations promulgated under it;
consistency is defined as compliance with "at least the minimum
applicable requirements set forth in any code, rule or regulations, promulgated pursuant to this article. ' 40 Consistency
is largely assured by the counties' assumption of responsibility
for conducting the first stages of the state's environmental ratings
program and by their extensive adoption of the state-prescribed
ambient air quality standards. Under the rating program, each
contaminant source in a county is required to submit to the
county health department a report which identifies the location of each emission point in its plant, presents a detailed analysis of surrounding land uses, explains each process and type of
emission, and estimates the environmental rating which the
company believes should be set for each of its contaminant
sources. The county health department reviews the report and,
if necessary, revises the proposed environmental rating up or
down. The reports are then submitted to the regional office of
39. Id. The operation of ratings is subordinated to that of any other state, rule
respecting a specific air contaminant or contaminant source and, also, "shall not be
construed to allow or permit any person to emit air contaminants in quantities which
alone or in combination with other source would contravene any established air quality
standards." Id. § 187.3 (3).
40. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1297 (1971). See also id. § 1294; Rules to Prevent
New Air Pollution in New York State, 10 N.Y. OFFICIAL COMPILATION OF CODES, RULES
AND REGULATIONS § 175.8 (1966).
The Act's preference for minimum state standards over more stringent local standards is also evidenced by the parity of treatment it extends to all local governments.
The Act gives cities and villages, along with the counties and towns which may territorially include them, the right to establish programs consonant with the minimum
state requirements. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1297 (McKinney 1971).
Thus, for example, though a city may lie within a county's boundaries, the county
has no competence within the city respecting matters on which the city has legislated
in conformity with the state's minimum requirements.
The minimum state standards also form the basis for certification under the state
and local programs for the income and real property tax abatement on air pollution
control facilities, authorized by the New York Tax Law sections 208, 612 and 706,
and the New York Real Property Tax Law section 481. The State Commissioner of
Health is authorized to issue the required certificates of compliance upon a showing
that the facilities comply "with applicable provisions of this chapter, the state sanitary
code and codes, rules, regulations, permits or orders issued pursuant thereto." N.Y. Pua.
HEALTH LAw §§ 1277-a, 1277-b (McKinney 1971). See also Rules to Prevent New Air
Pollution in New York State, 10 N.Y. OFFICIAL COMPILATION OF CODES, RULES AND REGULATIONS § 175.9 (1966).
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the state Environmental Conservation Department where further recommendations or changes may be made and then to the
central office of the Environmental Conservation Department
41
for final review.
Niagara County relies exclusively for its air quality standards upon the rules and regulations promulgated by the state
under the Air Pollution Control Act. Erie County, though it
relies extensively upon the state air quality standards, has augmented these with some regulations of its own.4 2 These regulations are variously absolute, specific and general. The provision
for control of pollution from open fires is, 43 for example, absolute in its effective proscription of the open burning of refuse
4
regardless of the nature or amounts of attendant contaminants.
Further, the standards governing emissions from incinerators
4
and refuse burning equipment, 45 and from process equipment
are highly specific, as compared with another provision which
prescribes limits for all visible emissions of any contaminants
from any combustion or process equipment or device. 47 All these
regulations are formulated by the Health Department's Air Pollution Control Division in consultation with the county's Technical Advisory Committee, a board of seven members specially
qualified by "professional training, experience and competence
in fields related to air pollution. ' 48
C. The Enforcement of Standards
The policy of the 1967 Air Quality Act, to avoid federal
preemption of state and local authority, is evident in its allo41. ERIE CouNTY, N.Y., DEP'T OF HEALTH AI POLLUTION CONTROL Div., 1969 MID-YEAR
Snu.ARaY REPORT 10-12 (1969).
42. ERIE COUNTY, N.Y., SANrrIAY CODE art. XIV, rule 1.5 (1969). The "Current Guides" are "incorporated by reference to inform all persons concerned as to
principles and considerations which will govern approval or rejection of applications
for permits, issuance of certificates of operation, notices, or other matters required under
the provisions of this Code." Id.
43. Id. art. XIV, rule 2.
44. Rule 2.2 of the Erie County Sanitary Code provides for certain exceptions
on the basis of type of source rather than nature or amounts of contaminants-e.g., for
outdoor grills and fireplaces for the purpose of preparing food, backyard burning of rubbish, properly operated industrial flares for combustion of flammable gases.
45. I4. rule &
46. Id. rule 5. Petroleum refining, by-product coke plants, fertilizer manufacture,
steel industry and grain industry are among the industrial operations separately regulated under this rule.
47. Id. rule 1.6.
48. Id. at XIV-2.
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cation to the states of the bulk of enforcement authority.49
Federal enforcement powers are sharply limited in each of the
three situations for which they are provided: enforcement of
air quality standards in the federally designated regions; abatement in areas outside of regions or in instances where standards
have not been prescribed; and abatement in emergency situations. Though the structure of each enforcement technique reflects a careful balance of state and federal interests, only the
first, enforcement under the regional method, need be considered here.
Enforcement under this method presupposes that a region
has been federally designated and that adequate air quality
standards have been prescribed for the region. Federal abatement procedures are initiated by a finding by the Director of the
Environmental Protection Agency, "on the basis of surveys,
studies and reports," that ambient air quality for any contaminant in a region is below the standards established for it,
and "that such lowered air quality results from a failure of a state
to take reasonable action to enforce such standards." 05 The
Director is then to notify the affected state or states, the persons
responsible for the violation, and other" interested parties of his
findings. In certain, quite limited, circumstances, he may then
request the Attorney General to bring an action for abatement."'
New York State employs two methods to fulfill the enforcement task imposed upon it by the federal legislation. Under one,
the state takes responsibility for identifying instances in which
an air quality standard is violated, for developing the facts relevant to the violation and for prosecuting the violator. Under
the second method, which New York's legislation envisions as
the predominant mode of regulation in the state, the state retains prosecutorial authority, but delegates to the subject of
enforcement responsibility for developing the relevant facts
and for identifying its own violations. This second enforcement
method is a function of two programs, environmental ratings,
49. "Consistent with the policy declaration of this title, municipal, state, and
interstate action to abate air pollution shall be encouraged and shall not be displaced
by Federal enforcement action except as otherwise provided by or pursuant to a court
order under subsection (c), (h), or (k) ." 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (b) (Supp. V, 1970).
50. Id. § 1857d (c) (4).
51. Id. § 1857d (c) - (g). The 1970 Clean Air Amendments significantly increase the
federal enforcement role. Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 113, 84 Stat. 1676, codified at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1857c-8 (Supp. May, 1971).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

which govern existing facilities, and certification, which governs
proposed facilities. The enforcement methods employed by the
counties essentially replicate those used by the state; though
some provision is made for enforcement of the first type, 2 prime
reliance is placed upon environmental rating and certification
programs.
Under the environmental ratings and certification programs,
the persons in charge of an existing or proposed facility are
required to file with state or county officals, as the case may be,
an initial report containing all information relevant to its emission
activities and, in the case of environmental ratings, to propose
a rating for the facility. Once an emissions limit for the facility is
set, either under a state- or county-approved rating or certificate,
the persons in control of the facility are periodically to file reports indicating the quantity of emissions discharged by the
facility.
The certification procedures developed under the New York
Air Pollution Control Act 5 require a submission of relevant
emissions data by "[a]ny person planning to construct a new
installation which will or might reasonably be expected to contribute to air pollution or make modifications to an existing installation which will or might reasonably be expected to increase the amount or change the effects or the characteristics of
the air contaminants discharged, or planning to install an air
cleaning device." 54 The application for a certificate is to be
accompanied by a report of expected performance and by plans
and specifications indicating the composition, concentration,
volume, temperature and rate of the applicant's emission before
and after the installation of an air cleaning device and the
location and range of effects of the emission. 5 Applications
"shall be approved, and a permit to construct issued, only when
52. Compare, EIE COUNTY, N.Y.,

SANITARY CODE

art. XIV, rule 6 (1964), with

Rules to Prevent New Air Pollution in New York State, 10 N.Y. OFFICIAL

Osi

CODES,

RULES

AND REGULATIONS pts.

CoMPILATIoN

176-79 (1967). Environmental ratings are dis.

cussed supra, pp. 12-14.
53. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 1277(2) (j)

(McKinney 1971); Rules to Prevent

New Air Pollution in New York State, 10 N.Y. OFFCIAL COMPILATION OF CoDES, RULES
AND REGULATIONS pts. 175-80 (1966).
54. Rules to Prevent New Air Pollution in New York State, 10 OFFICIAL COMPILATION
OF CODES, RULES AND REGULATIONS § 176.1 (1966).
55. Id. § 176.4.
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it appears that they are in accordance with engifneering guides
'
acceptable to the commissioner.' ae
An applicant' is entitled,
upon denial of his application, to a hearing before the Commissioner and to consideration of a revised application. 7 The
grant of a certificate to operate only provides some assurance
that the facility certified will be permitted to operate in the
futuie. The Commissioner's authority to rescind the certificate
is not limited to instances of an operation's non-compliance with
the conditions upon which the certificate is based; he may
also, after a hearing, rescind or modify the certificate when it
appears that the prescribed conditions themselves are no
longer in accord with the Act or the rules or regulations promulgated under it.1s With certain specified exceptions,59 operation
of a new or altered facility without the Commissioner's certification is subject to the penalties provided for violation of Commissioner's orders generally. 0
Environmental ratings and certification programs are supplemented at both the state* and county levels by more traditional enforcement methods in which responsibility for the
identification and supervision of emissions, as well as prosecution of violations, is lodged in the state or county. These methods, like their ratings and certifications counterparts, generally
comport with the implicit requirements of the federal Air Quality Act that the method of regulation be tailored to the circumstances of the particular situation. Under the state abatement
programs, for example, where the effects of a contaminant emission
56. Id. § 176.5(b).
57. Id.§ 176. (c).
58. id. § 176.5 (d).
59. The exceptions provided are of two kinds. First, sections 176.2 and 176.3
of the Rules to Prevent New Air Pollution in New York State provide for a waiver of
approval prior to construction in instances where "the requirement for approval prior
to construction will create an undue hardship to the applicant." The applicant, however, "after a waiver is granted, proceeds with the construction at his own risk; and if
after construction . . has begun or been completed, the-. . . completed installations
do not meet the commissioner's approval, the alterations required to effect such approval
shall be made within a reasonable time, as specified by the commissioner." Id.
Second, part 177 provides for variances and exemptions from the certification requirements in cases of secret processes or methods of manufacture or production; trial
installations; relocations or minor alterations; and specified operations, such as
comfort heating equipment, fuel burning equipment and indnerators utilized singly or
jointly by the occupants of dwellings containing four or less apartment units, and
tailpipe exhaust systems in automotive repair shops and internal combustion engines.
60. Id. §§ 180.3 9- 180.4.
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are not pressing, and jarring economic consequences would attend immediate abatement, the Act encourages phased regulation
of the emission source. Where, however, the emission poses a
manifest health hazard, immediate controls are indicated regardless of economic consequence."' The structure of state enforcement proceedings follows the contours of administrative proceedings generally and is closely circumscribed by considerations
of procedural due process. 2
Respondent's failure to comply with a Commissioner's
order rendered after hearing is subject to suit by the state attorney general for an injunction of the offending conduct and recovery of penalties-not to exceed $1,000 for each violation and
61. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 16, 1282 (3) (McKinney 1971).
Reasonable regulation, should, however, be based on an accurate measurement
of the health and welfare needs, technological feasibility of abatement of pollution and economic factors involved. Where health considerations permit
and there are technological obstacles or known and seriously adverse economic
results which would grow out of precipitous abatement action, the timetable
for developments through research should be synchronized so that the pollution problem can be solved in an orderly manner.
On the other hand, where there are health hazards, it is expected that
State and local authorities will take the necessary abatement action, and if
they do not, the Secretary is specifically authorized to commence abatement
action.
S. REP. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1967).
62. Enforcement actions are initiated by a finding of the Commissioner that there
has been a violation of any code, rule or regulation prescribed for air quality control.
This initial finding is to be based upon an investigation precipitated either by a written
complaint or at the Commissioner's initiative. The accused violator is to be served with
notice at least fifteen days prior to the hearing in his case. N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW §§
1279-80 (McKinney 1971). See also N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERV. LAw § 15 (7) (McKinney 1970).
The fifteen-day notice requirement may be waived only where the Commissioners
investigation reveals that the alleged violation is endangering the public health; under
these circumstances the Commissioner is required to order an immediate abatement of
the discharge and to hold a hearing on the matter "as promptly as possible thereafter"--not to exceed fifteen days. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 16 (McKinney 1971). Compare
N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERv. LAW § 16 (McKiiney 1970), which adds to the predicate of danger to health a broader basis for the summary action: "presents an imminent
danger to the health or welfare of the people of the state or results in or is likely to result in irreversible or irreparable damage to natural resources .... "Id.
The hearing is to be held before the Commissioner or his delegate and is to be
public; the respondent violator is given the opportunity to file a written answer to
the complaint, "and with or without counsel, and may submit testimony, or may do both."
At the request of the respondent, the hearing officer is required to subpoena witnesses
and relevant documents. The final order of the hearing officer is to be
based upon a consideration of written and oral statements and testimony and argu.
ments, and, depending upon the circumstances of the case, may require either an im.
mediate or a phased cessation of the respondent's emissions in excess of the pre.
scribed standards. Id. §§ 1280 & 1281.
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$200 for each day during which the violation continues, "commencing on the first day after the expiration of the time so
fixed in the order of the Commissioner for the taking of such
preventive or corrective measures. ' 63 The rules governing the
availability of judicial review of the Commissioner's final order
are more liberal than those applicable to review of other types of
administrative proceedings in the state system.64
Under the enforcement programs in Erie and Niagara
Counties, conduct which, for one reason or another, is not subject to either of the counties' two self-executing enforcement
procedures is, if it contravenes the air quality standards prescribed by the county, nonetheless subject to abatement at the
order of the County Health Commissioner. Failure to comply
with the Commissioner's abatement order-or with the abatement orders which may issue upon non-compliance with either
of the two self-enforcing procedures-is remediable, at the Commissioner's instance, by a full range of enforcement techniques
including injunctive relief and the attendant contempt remedies,
fines, and sealing of the offending equipment. 5 Additionally,
in some instances, enforcement measures are specifically tailored
63. Id. §§ 1286 & 1287.
64. In addition to authorizing proceedings under the New York Civil Practice Law
and Rules Section 78-the standard proceedings for review of administrative actionsection 1283 of the New York Public Health Law provides:
(2) (a) When a review in accordance with article seventy-eight of the civil
practice law and rules is not maintainable, either because the person aggrieved was not a party to the original proceedings in which the order or determination or other action which is sought to be reviewed was made or taken,
or for any other reason, the order or determination of the commissioner and
the validity or reasonableness of any code, rule or regulation of the board may
nevertheless be reviewed as hereinafter provided in this subdivision.
65. ERIE COUNTY, N.Y., SANITARY CODE art. XIV, rule 7 (1969). The operation of

the sealing provision is typical:
7.7 Sealing
After any owner of any premises, or any agent acting in his behalf, has been
notified of a violation of this Code and if a state of compliance has not been
reached within the time period specified by the Commissioner of Health as
just and adequate for abatement, he shall be notified to show cause before
the said Commissioner on a day certain within 30 days of such notice why
such equipment should not be sealed. If, upon the hearing, the Commissioner
of Health finds that means or installations have been employed which produced air pollution and which are contrary to any provisions of this Code,
he shall order such equipment to be sealed until adequate action, approved
by the said Commissioner is taken to comply with the provisions of this Code.
Such action may be in addition to Administrative proceedings, fines and penalties. No seal on any fuel-burning equipment or premise shall be removed without written permission from the Commissioner of Health.
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to meet the unique needs of particular types of emissions facilities. ,,
D. An Introduction to Legal and Real Models
This article's central conclusion is that the rules for air
quality management legislated at the federal, state and county
levels of government-rules which form what will be called the
"legal model"-have few counterparts in the conduct of air
quality management as it occurs in Erie and Niagara Countiesconduct which forms the "real model." Simply, official conduct
in the two-county area follows patterns which are not explicitly
contemplated, much less mandated, by the federal, state and
county laws.
The distinction between "legal" and "real" models is a
difficult one, to be sure. For example, official conduct, assigned
by this study to the real model, bears, to the extent that it is
sanctioned, the imprimatur of law and could for this reason be
assigned to a legal model. On the other hand, even the most precise legal rule is not immutable and is subject to varying interpretations by the judiciary; this variability of legal doctrine
within an explicit legal framework raises the question whether
it is proper to include judicial action and its effects in a legal
rather than in a real model. Because judicial action involving
air quality management in Western New York has been virtually nonexistent, this particular problem is absent from the present study.
The distinction between legal and real models, though problematic, is helpful for purposes of systematic analysis. As used
here it characterizes the legal model as consisting of the struc66. E.g., id. rule 3.3:
Abatement. When the Commissioner of Health has determined that any fuel
burning equipment, or combustion installation is being operated so as to cause
a violation of Rule 3.1 he may:

a. Require the installation of smoke recording devices.
b. Order the use of control equipment or devices to serve any such fuel burning equipment, or combustion installation.
c. Order a change in the manner of operation of any such equipment or installation.
d. Order the cleaning, repair, replacement or alteration of any such equipment
or installation, or such control equipment, which causes or is operated
so as to cause a violation of Rule 3.1.
e. Seal in accordance with Rule 7.7, any equipment which does not conform to
the requirements of Rule 3.1.
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tures of competently legislated rules designed for a particular
regulatory context, and characterizes the real model as consisting of the structures of regulatory behavior which exist in
the context for which the legislated rules were designed. This
sort of distinction has roots in the division between "law in
books" and "law in action" perceived by legal realists and also
roughly coincides with the distinction made by organizational
theorists between an organization's formal "blueprint" and its
6 7
"informal component.

Synthesis of a legal model from the federal, state and
county laws described above raises an additional problem, one
of determining legislative intent. There are clear dangers in
identifying a rule's explicit requirements with the intent of its
framers. If, for example, conduct desired by a legislative body
will' obtain regardless of the existence of a contradictory and
ostensibly governing rule, the body may enact the rule in order
to secure other benefits, knowing that it will not lose the benefits
of the conduct which it desires. This phenomenon occurs with
perhaps the most dramatic frequency in the context of morals
legislation: effectively unenforced against offenders, rules for
moral conduct are nonetheless retained to buttress perceived
needs for religious or related values or to help secure other
needs such as the punishment of undesirables who have not
been detected violating any other legal rule. Given the scarcity
of legislative history at the state and local levels of air quality
rulemaking and, in any event, its questionable capacity to shed
light on real intent of this sort, the study's approach in drafting
a legal model was to assume an identity between the rules'
explicit requirements and their underlying legislative intent.
Considered in this light, the legal model of air quality
management in the Niagara Frontier consists of two elements:
methods for the allocation of management authority and methods
for its exercise. The model's allocative method contemplates
both vertical and horizontal integration of management functions.
As a matter of vertical integration, the federal government deleSee, e.g., P. BLAU,THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRACY 2 (1955):
ETihe behavior of the members of an organization does not precisely correspond to its blueprint . ... [I]n the course of operations, new elements
arise in the structure that influence subsequent operations. Recent studies of
organization have emphasized the importance of these emergent factors, such
67.

as informal relations or unofficial norms.
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gates to the states the bulk of authority to prescribe and enforce
air quality standards and reserves to the federal Environmental
Protection Agency only a residual authority to prescribe air
quality criteria and enforce air quality standards. New York
State, in turn, exercises some of the delegated prescriptive authority-in its designation of ambient air standards-but assigns an
important part of the prescriptive, and almost all of the enforcement, authority to Erie and Niagara Counties in their formulation and supervision of emission control standards through, the
environmental ratings and certification programs. Horizontal integration, under which local governments within a federally
designated region are to cooperate with each other in managing
air quality on a regional basis, lies at the heart of the 1967 federal
Air Quality Act and is, though less explicitly, a feature of the New
York legislation as well. No legal rules or institutions governing
this sort of horizontal integration exist within the Niagara Frontier Air Quality Region.
The legal model's second component, which consists of
methods for the exercise of prescription and enforcement authority, assumes at the threshold that the prescription and enforcement functions are distinct, that, as a governmental process,
the formulation of ambient air and emission control standards
is entirely separate from the enforcement of these standards. The
first step under this model is designation of standards, initially in the form of air quality criteria, then as air quality standards, then environmental ratings and, finally, as emission control
standards. Individual conduct is, under the model, to be compared with the applicable standards and, if violative, prosecuted by the United States Attorney General, the state attorney
general or the county district attorney, and the proper remediesfine, injunction or sealing-sought. The discretionary component of official exercises, and the standards for judicial review
of these exercises, are not specifically described by any of the
air quality laws which form the legal model but, as a general
matter of administrative law, should be included.
The next two sections chart the extent to which the official and non-official conduct which forms the real model departs
from the features of the legal model. Two broad conclusions
will be drawn. First, the contemplated patterns of vertical
22
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integration have been accomplished only partially and the patterns of horizontal integration not at all, a circumstance probably attributable to the development of a variety of countervailing personnel groupings and allegiances. Second, the legal
model's assumed distinction between prescription and enforcement in fact has little place in the regulation of air quality as it
occurs in Erie and Niagara Counties. Underlying this second
conclusion, that prescription and enforcement are thoroughly
mixed, is the presence, at least in this two-county region, of a
regulatory force not contemplated by the legal model-the subjects of enforcement themselves.
II.

ORGANIZATION

OF

OFFICIAL

BEHAVIOR:

THE

REGIONAL

SCHEME

The reason the legal model locates the bulk of prescription
and enforcement authority in the states is that the state is the
smallest established political unit whose boundaries comprehend those of the regional problem s and, possessing significant resources, is in the best position to prescribe technologically
sound standards for each air quality region within its borders
and to deal responsibly with the federal Environmental Protection Agency in its review of these standards. The reason the
legal model requires that lines of cooperation exist between the
local governments whose boundaries, taken together, coincide
with those of the air quality region is that, to the extent that
the state delegates prescription or enforcement authority to local
governments within the region, exercises of this authority must
be coordinated regionally. Neither of these two aspects of the legal
model forms a significant part of the real model. First, the state
has delegated almost complete authority for the prescription
and enforcement of air quality standards to the two counties which
form the Niagara Frontier Air Quality Control Region and,
second, only scant patterns of cooperation have developed between
these two counties.
68. Interstate compacts have been resorted to for the regulation of air quality
problems which cross state boundaries. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857a(a), 1857c-1 (1969).
See generally Green, State Control of Interstate Air Pollution, 83 LAW 9- CoNTEMP. PROB.
315 (1968) ; Hearings before a Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate
Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1968) (hearings addressed to three
proposed compacts: West Virginia-Ohio (S. 2350); Mid-Atlantic States (S.J. Res. 95)
(New York-New Jersey-Delaware-Connecticut-Pennsylvania); Illinois-Indiana (S. 470)).
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One reason for the patterns of official conduct which have
developed and, more significantly, for the patterns of dominant
state authority and intercounty cooperation which have not
developed, is indicated by an historical footnote. The roles which
had been assumed by the state and the Erie and Niagara County
Health Departments prior to the effective date of the 1967 Air
Quality Act were, to varying extents, at odds with the allocation
contemplated by the federal legislation: the state had delegated
the bulk of enforcement and prescription authority to the counties and had reserved to itself only a residual authority for review. For their part, the two counties were functioning entirely
independently of each other. Probably for reasons of exigence and
lack of necessary supervision, passage of the 1967 Act did little
to alter this pattern. Because it had determined initially to
lodge in the counties primary responsibility for the prescription
and enforcement of contaminant emission standards, the state in
1967 possessed neither the personnel nor the mechanisms to itself accomplish these tasks in the manner contemplated by the
federal legislation. And, because under the federal act the state
was assigned not only the responsibility for prescription and enforcement of air quality standards but, also, the prime authority
to supervise the introduction and allocation of this responsibility, it was under no compulsion to alter its pre-1967 delegation to the counties. By the same token, because the state was
not compelled to impose a cooperative, regional arrangement
upon the two counties, the counties were left to develop these
arrangements on their own. The county health units, conditioned
to independent action and themselves in no way compelled to
relinquish their -habits of autonomy, did not move in the
direction of cooperative activity.69
Factors of institutional habit recur in the real model's
departures from the legal model. This section will document
these and other instances of disparity between the real and legal
models and will suggest some reasons for their persistence.
The importance of this documentation, of identifying the political units which are effectively responsible for the implementation of air quality standards, lies in the fact that the quality of
standards and of their enforcement varies with the jurisdiction
69.

See pp. 25-28, infra.
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responsible for them. The federal act's assumption that the prescription and enforcement job it best done by the states with some
assistance from closely-knit regions aside, this does not mean that
exercise at one level of jurisdiction will necessarily be better than
exercise at another level, only that it will be different. It is
also important to identify the reasons for the disparities between
the real and legal models. For example, if it is concluded that
the methods employed in the implementation of standards under
the real model are inadequate and that the implementation
methods intended by the present, or some other, legal model
would be better, then those obstacles which stand in the way of
the legal model becoming real must be understood.
A. Patterns of Horizontal Integration
Patterns of horizontal integration, of joint air quality
management activities between the local governments whose
boundaries form an air quality region, are both the premise and
the objective of the 1967 Air Quality Act's regional designation.
Because the Act has as one of its objectives fostering joint management efforts by local governments within air quality regions, it
has been interpreted to require that every regional designation
account for the existence and effect within the technologically
suited area of jurisdictional boundaries and patterns of interjurisdictional cooperation. In the case of the designation of
the two-county Niagara Frontier Region, this requirement was
ostensibly met through consideration both of formal institutions and informal contacts. The federal study reported that formal institutions were sparse at the time the regional designation
was made-"The Erie and Niagara Programs have not established any joint activities such as joint air quality management,
joint technical facilities, or joint enforcement of air pollution
regulations"-and relied almost exclusively upon the existeace
of the Erie and Niagara Counties Regional Planning Board as
justification for the two-county designation.
Formal institutions have not, since the time of the designation, increased in
number or in the extent of their activities and it can be concluded, at this point at least, that the regional designation has
70.
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done nothing to stimulate growth in patterns of formal, institutional cooperation between local governments.
The same federal study which observed the paucity of formal
cooperative arrangements within the two-county area concluded
that, "[h]owever, the two programs do maintain informal contact."7 ' There is at present, though, no observable informal contact between air quality personnel in the two counties. Interviews
conducted at all official levels in both the Erie and Niagara County
health departments revealed that personnel in one department
neither maintained, nor even attempted, communication with
personnel in the other department. Queried whether they had contact with any other agencies involved in air quality management,
respondents in each county department uniformly failed to mention the other. Moreover, questioned as to their views of the
"regional arrangement," most respondents initially assumed the
interviewer was speaking of the funding conducted by the regional
office of the state health department. 2 The difference between the
findings uncovered by the interviews and the one stated in the
federal study can be explained in one of two ways. First, both
findings may be correct and informal contacts, present at the time
the federal investigation was conducted, may have dissipated by
the time the present interviews were made. Or, second, one of
the findings may be incorrect, with the implication that informal
contact did exist at both times or did not exist at either time.
That the latter findings is probably the correct one is suggested
by an examination of the organizational and operational styles of
the health departments of the two counties.
The respective organization and operations of the air pollution control divisions of the two health departments are singularly unconducive to cooperative effort. To begin with, the
styles and resources of the two divisions are not only markedly
different, but the differences are of a sort which tend to underline

71. Id. at 15.

72. When the interviewer indicated that his question's reference was to the federal
regional scheme, approximately two-thirds of the personnel questioned responded that
they thought the scheme worked well; queried why they thought it worked well, each
responded in terms which suggested that he thought it worked well because it left
his organization largely autonomous.
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hostility or, at least, jealousy7 3 In all formal senses, Erie County's
air pollution control division is the more developed of the two:
it consists of thirty-five members with prescription or enforcement responsibilities, as against Niagara's eight; as between personnel occupying positions of comparable responsibility in the
two departments, Erie County's personnel have the more extensive academic training and field experience and enjoy higher
salaries; the field and laboratory equipment available to the
Erie County division is considerably more extensive and sophisticated than that available to the Niagara County division. 4 The
organizational styles of the two air pollution control divisions
also differ. Erie County's air pollution control division is,
generally characterized, bureaucratic: administration and delegation of authority are based upon a chain of command, and
communication along the chain is often by means of written
memoranda. The structure of Niagara County's air pollution
control division, on the other hand, can be characterized as
familial or even feudal: loyalty and group ties constitute its main
basis for administration and delegation of authority and the
division was often described by its personnel as "one large fam75

ily."

73. Because in the interviews members of one department consistently failed to
express any views of the other department, there is no direct, perceptual evidence
available to indicate the extent to which these differences would deter cooperative
effort. The failure to express perceptions, or the fact that no perceptions are held,
however, may in these circumstances provide some evidence, however indirect, of the
unlikeliness of cooperation between the two.
74. According to information contained in federal grants applications for the 1971
fiscal year, for example, the value of the Niagara County Air Pollution Control
Division's assets is one-tenth ($25,000) that of the Erie County Air Pollution Control Division's ($250,000) and its annual budget is approximately one-sixth that of Erie

County's:
PROPOSED 1971 BUDGET
FEDERAL
SHARE

STATE
SHARE

COUNTY
SHARE

TOTAL

ERIE ............
$205,000
205,500
205,500
616,000
NIAGARA ......
$90,000
15,000
15,000
120,000
75. Comparable examples of diverse organizational structures and their effects upon
an organization's legal style are presented in H. JACOB, DEBTORs IN COURT (1969); Dertnick,
Intercity Differences in Administration of the Public Assistance Program: The Case of
Massachusetts, in CITY POLmCS AND PUBLIC POLICY 243 (J. Wilson ed. 1968).
The organizational distinctions between the Erie County and Niagara County Air
Pollution Control Divisions closely correspond with the distinctions between the first
two of the three styles of police conduct observed by James Wilson--"legalistic," "watchman" and "service." J. WILSON, VARITIEs OF POLICE BEHAVIOR (1968).
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Two other factors support the view that the two air pollution control divisions tend to be institutionally incompatible.
First, since each is situated within the organizational structure
of a county health department, any decision to link the two divisions by more than the most informal ties must be made by the
parent health departments or, of course, at the state or federal
level. Because the main business of the county health departments consists of county-wide health problems and lacks, for
this reason, a regional perspective, the two air pollution control
divisions tend to be distinctly independent in their responsibility to a county community. Thus, because the institutions
responsible for the management of a regional problem are
lodged in larger, jurisdictionally distinct entities with independent allegiances, formal institutional links are as unlikely as the
atmosphere for informal ties is rare. Second, and perhaps most
significant, is the factor of inertia. Given, on the one hand,
present and historical patterns of independent action and, on
the other, no countervailing factors stronger than the manifest
technological feasibility of regional cooperation, it is unlikely
that cooperative effort will materialize.
B.

Patterns of Vertical Integration

Like the patterns of horizontal integration, the patterns of
strong vertical authority, running from state to county or other
local government, contemplated by the federal Air Quality Act
have not materialized other than in special, nonrecurring situations. The state avoids any systematic and direct enforcement
role within Erie and Niagara Counties and restricts its enforcement of air quality standards to two situations: intercounty contamination and, intermittently, contamination in neighboring
counties which lack developed enforcement machinery. , , What
scant state authority there is in Erie and Niagara Counties is
represented by indirect exercises-funding and the review of environmental ratings. For a number of reasons which are explored
76. Consider the remarks of two state officials:
"Let me start by saying we are not an enforcement agency. We are an administrative agency. In a few special cases we become involved with enforcement ....
We also become involved in intercounty pollution .... "
"Enforcement is the responsibility of the county. With the exception of counties that lack the necessary machinery for enforcement, all counties are expected
to assume responsibility for enforcement."
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in the next section, environmental ratings do not in fact constitute the central basis for air quality management in the Niagara
Frontier Region and, as a consequence, the state authority exercised through them is more limited than might appear from
the legal model. And, for reasons to be explored in this section,
funding provides only a limited means of control.
Though they are not the primary real control mechanism,
environmental ratings do represent the primary legal control
mechanism and, as such, have become the focus of contentions
for authority between the state and counties. Two patterns have
emerged from these contentions: sporadic state reversals of county-set ratings on the ground that they are too lenient and, specifically, reversal by the state of a higher percentage of the ratings
set by the Erie County Health Department than of those set
by the Niagara County Health Department. The interviews with
state and county officials suggest one reason for the pattern of
state upgrading of ratings prescribed by the two counties. The
environmental ratings set by the counties are initially proposed
by the subjects of regulation-whose inclination will naturally
be to leniency-and then made the basis for negotiation between
the subject and the county health officials. Compromise is consequently implicit in the ratings adopted by the county and
passed on to the state for review. Because the state review process
is entirely insulated from representations made by the subject of
regulation, except of course to the extent that the effect of these
representations is inherent in the county-set rating, it will, even
if it employs the same objective criteria as those used by the county, produce a more stringent rating.
Though the interviews revealed no specific or direct causes
of the state's differential treatment on review of the ratings prescribed by Erie and Niagara Counties, they did indicate a more
basic reason for Erie's experience with a rate of reversal higher
than Niagara's. Simply, the pattern of state-county relationship
which has developed is one of extensive cooperation between the
state and the Niagara County Health Department and of recurrent friction between the state and the Erie County Health Department. Some typical remarks of the regional state officials may
convey the spirit of these relationships: "Erie we've had difficulties
with. They only cooperate under extreme forcefulness"; "In-
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doctrinated with home rule philosophy in Erie. They don't cooperate with the state in many areas"; "They [Erie] never hand
in complete reports ....
Abatement schedules and emission schedules are six months behind Niagara County"; "Niagara County
is performing a very good job, though they lack engineering personnel"; Niagara is almost on a par with us."7
That the concerns implicit in these remarks stem from
mutually exclusive needs for cooperation and autonomy is
evidenced in part by the factors of organization, resource and
style, already explored, which hinder coordination between the
counties. Because Niagara County's operation is small, resourcepoor and, in terms of available technology, relatively unsophisticated, it considers itself to be in need of assistance from the
more resourceful state unit in order to fulfill its mandated tasks.
At the same time, and for the same reasons, the state's sense of
autonomy is apparently not threatened by association with the
Niagara County organization. Erie County's operation, on the
other hand, is based upon significant resources, is technologically
sophisticated and is formally organized; the apparent inclination of such a self-reliant organization has been toward autonomy.
The state, whose regional staff is one-quarter the size of Erie
County's, and has access to technological resources no more refined than Erie's is manifestly threatened by the county's operation to the extent that, in order to safeguard its own autonomy,
it is content to leave Erie County in an autonomous position. 8
77. The counties' views of the state role are not entirely complementary. Perceptions of the state operations expressed by Erie County health personnel were
guarded and, while clearly not positive, were not notably negative either. The theme
repeatedly stressed was the state's insulation from the realities of enforcement. And,
the apparent closeness of their ties notwithstanding, perceptions of the state operation
expressed by Niagara County officials were as noncommittal as those expressed by Erie
County officials. The reasons for this may lie not so much in the counties' relations with
the state as in their expressed perception of the roles performed by their own units.
Erie's personnel appear, for example, to be guarded in their judgments generally; asked
to comment on the performance of their county department, Erie officials typically responded: "We do as well or better than some ... but I do know from an overall picture
there is still a lot of room for improvement;" "For size, I think we are one of the largest
in the state." Niagara's personnel responded quite differently. Their remarks suggest a
self-image which rests on notions of autonomy; for example: "I think we're one of the
leading ones in the state-our progress seems to be far in the advance of other counties
78. Though the feelings towards the Erie County operation held by the state
personnel can generally be characterized as hostile, state personnel also consistently expressed a substantial disinclination, in the words of one, "to push Erie too far. It's better
to leave things be, than let them deteriorate further."
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The one clear reflection in the legal model of these real model
patterns is Niagara County's exclusive reliance upon the state
regulations as contrasted with Erie County's reliance upon
its own regulations along with those of the state.
That review of environmental ratings represents one of the
two prime sources of state-county contact and that, at least
in the case of Erie County, the relationship is so negatively
charged, accounts in part for the absence of broadly-based patterns of vertical cooperation in the Niagara Frontier Region.
State funding of county operations, the other basis for vertical
relationship within the region, has done little to advance cooperation between the state and Erie County or, for that matter, between the state and Niagara County. The state cash subsidy,
which is given to the county's health department and is earmarked
for use in the department's air quality control efforts, is awarded on
a matching basis, with the state share made proportionate to the
county's contribution to its own air quality management effort.
Since they allocate different amounts of their own funds to air
quality management programs, Erie and Niagara Counties receive different amounts from the state: Erie County receives
an average amount equivalent to slightly under nineteen cents
per county resident; Niagara County receives an amount equivalent to slightly under seven cents per resident.
Because the state is charged by the federal act with responsibility for the enforcement as well as prescription of ambient
air standards in its air quality regions and because, in fact, the
state has delegated almost the entire enforcement function for
the Niagara Frontier Region to Erie and Niagara Counties, an
ostensible purpose of its subvention of the counties' enforcement
operations is discharge of its enforcement responsibility through
payments to county units rather than through employment of its
own personnel. Though this sort of delegation and grant structure
does not necessarily entail a sacrifice by the state of direct control of environmental management activities, the state has for
another reason in fact relinquished direct control. Locked into the
funding formula set by its matching funds system, the state cannot otherwise vary the amount of funds provided to. a single
county and, specifically, cannot employ the variance as a tool
of reward or punishment for county performance. The single
31
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option available to the state--withdrawal of all funds-is so
drastic that it lacks effect as a control mechanism. The absence
from this option of any real sanction is specifically attributable
to two facts: a grant withdrawal would probably have to be justified by the state's showing of extreme willfulness on the county's part; and, even if willfulness could be shown, withdrawal
would require the state to identify or, more likely, construct a
new enforcement unit in the county in question.
The systematic patterns of horizontal and vertical integration envisioned and mandated by the 1967 Air Quality Act
have not materialized in the Niagara Frontier Region. Grants
administration and the system of environmental ratings have displayed little capacity to break down what appear to be longstanding traditions of institutional autonomy among public
health units in the area. Indeed, as administered, the grants and
environmental ratings programs have acquired rather than eliminated the characteristics of a system of autonomous institutions.
Inertia is not, of course, alone responsible for the Air Quality
Act's failure to advance horizontal and vertical cooperation;
differences of size, style and resources have significantly hindered
cooperative activity. One conclusion which can be drawn from
this section's examination is that the bulk of responsibility for
prescription and enforcement is effectively vested in the counties' air pollution control divisions. A second conclusion, which
can be drawn from the analysis in the next section, is that the
sharp institutional differences between the divisions in the two
counties are essentially irrelevant to the enforcement and
prescription tasks as they are performed by them under the real
model. The conclusion to be drawn from these fundamental
similarities in the work of the two divisions, as they are revealed by the real model, is not that they can form the basis for
cooperative effort but, rather, that in light of them, the values
attached by the legal model to cooperation may be altogether
illusory.
III.

THE DYNAMICS OF OFFICIAL BEHAVIOR: THE PRESCRIPTION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF STANDARDS

The legal model formed by the federal, state and county laws
respecting air quality in the Niagara Frontier Region contem-
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plates that discretion will be exercised in both. the prescription
and enforcement of air quality standards. As in the case of the
many other legal structures which vest in administrative agencies responsibility for the regulation of complex and dynamic
patterns of conduct, this structure justifies its grant of discretion
on the ground that the problems involved are best resolved
on an ad hoc basis by agencies able to employ their relevant expertise in a setting free from all but the most exigent guiding
principles. In the case of the present legal model, the term,
"reasonable," inserted in the applicable federal, state and county
legislation, constitutes the predicate for the exercise of discretion
and, as is the case in the classical model of administrative law, provision is made for judicial review of administrative action.
To some extent, exercises of discretion under the real model
conform to the formal expectations of the legal model. For example, the state and Erie County codes have long provided for
the measurement and regulation of smoke emissions exclusively
on the basis of relative blackness according to the Ringelmann
Scale 79 and, only recently, have added provision for their measurement on the basis of opacity. The opacity test, which measures the extent of light blockage rather than the blackness of
the smoke, calls for the evaluation of many more factors than
does the Ringelmann test and for the exercise of considerably
more discretion. Erie County health officials have recently applied
the opacity test to the continuing discharge of red smoke from a
steel manufacturing plant within the county; the question
whether application of the opacity test to red smoke emissions constitutes an abuse of discretion is, at the time of this writing, being readied for exposure to judicial review.80
To a more considerable extent, exercises of discretion under
the real model depart from the blueprint of the legal model.
In the most significant departure, both counties have effectively
delegated to the industries and other intended subjects of air
quality management within their borders a large portion of the
79. The Ringelmann Scale for Grading the Density of Smoke, also referred to as
the Ringelmann Chart, was developed during the late 1800's by Maximillian Ringelmann
and consists of a system of grids of varying tone values for the purpose of visually measuring various densities of smoke. It presently forms the basis of smoke ordinances in many
state and local governments.
80. County of Erie Dep't of Health, In the Matter Arising out of Alleged Violation
of art. XIV of the Erie County Sanitary Code, Hearing Held Before Commissioner of
Health (Aug. 25, 1970).
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authority to prescribe and enforce standards."' Because judicial review of these delegations and the exercises of discretion which occur under them is rare, the tendency of the exercises to expand
further has not been checked.
The several consequences of these departures are pervasive and cumulative, each building upon the one preceding.
First, responsibility for proposal of the emission standards which
are to govern each of the subjects of enforcement, vested in the
county health departments under the legal model, has been delegated by the health departments to the subjects of enforcement.
Though the responsibility delegated is for proposal only, and
though the process through which it is exercised is called "environmental ratings" rather than "standards proposal," the consequence of the delegation has been to give enforcement subjects effective control over the formulation of applicable standards.
Second, under a related delegation, responsibility for proposing a
timetable for compliance with the prescribed emission standards
has been vested by the county health departments in the subjects of enforcement. Third, the county health departments identify "compliance" not with a correspondence between the emissions control timetable and the extent, at any time, of the
subject's emissions but, rather, with the subject's expenditure of
good faith efforts in the direction of meeting its timetable. The
sections which follow explore some of the reasons for these departures from the legal model and introduce a related set of circumstances which tend to support them, those which attend the
official agency's dealings with some of its audiences.
A. The Location of Authority
The same factors of technological complexity which recommended the legislative grant of discretion to administrative agencies may also be responsible for abuses of that discretion or, at
least, for administrative departures from the legal model of discretionary exercise. The legislative decision to allow administrative discretion, rather than an articulate set of rules, to govern
the resolution of technologically complex questions, stems from
a felt need for flexibility and expertise. Yet, the agency granted
81.

For an extended consideration of the nature and implications of regulatory

agencies' delegations of authority to the subjects of regulation, see M. BIERNSTEIN,
REGULATING BUSINESS

BY INDEPENDENT

COMMISSION
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the discretion may, if it finds its own expertise and resources
too limited to cope with the problems assigned, engage in a further delegation of its authority to other institutions which, in
its view, possess the resources necessary for resolution. The subsequent delegation may be to a nongovernmental institution and,
specifically, to the very object of regulation. A significant portion
of the autnority to prescribe and enforce air quality standards in
Erie and Niagara Counties has been subjected to a delegation of
the latter sort.
Translation of ambient air quality standards into emission
control standards is the task whose complexity prompted this delegation by the county. Responsibility for discharge of this task
is delegated by the federal Air Quality Act to the states which,
in turn, have delegated it to the counties. Ambient air quality
standards, it will be recalled, prescribe the tolerable level for
any given contaminant in a region's air; emission control standards, prescribed for every source of contaminants within the
region, determine the extent to which each source must curtail
its emission of the specified contaminant in order for the
air quality standard set for the region to be maintained. The
difficulties involved in the prescription of emission control
standards lie in determining the extent to which every source
must cut back its emissions for an overall air quality level to be
reached, a problem complicated by the fact that different yet fair
restrictions must be fashioned for sources of different types and
sizes.
The difficulty of attaining a prescribed level of air quality
through this method is compounded by at least two other factors.
First, the contaminants which affect a region's air quality are
not necessarily emitted from sources within the region, nor, forthat matter, do contaminants from sources within the region.
necessarily affect the region's air quality; in both cases, contaminants wafting from and into areas neighboring the region
complicate the evaluation process. Second, since contaminantproducing activities within a region are dynamic-production
levels fluctuate, new industries enter and old ones leave-any
translation of ambient air standards into specific emission control standards, no matter how precise at the time executed, will
at any other time probably be inaccurate. 2
82. See pp. 39.40, infra.
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The county health department's transfer to the subjects
of enforcement of the technologically complex task of deriving
individual emission standards from general air quality standards is accomplished through the environmental ratings program
in which the subjects of enforcement are effectively given responsibility for the initial prescription of emission control standards. Under the program, whose function has been considered
above, 3 the county health department distributes to all enforcement subjects within its jurisdiction standard forms providing a textual description of each environmental rating and
spaces in which the subject is to make a fact statement describing the extent of its emissions and the nature of its surrounding
environment, and in which it is to propose an environmental
rating for itself. The proposed rating is then compared by the
health department with the subject's fact statement and is then
either accepted or returned to the subject for revision. Once the
rating is approved by the health department, it is submitted
to the regional office of the state Environmental Conservation
Department for review.14 There is strong evidence that these
ratings are the subject of negotiation between the enforcement subjects and the county and, subsequently, between the county and
the state regional office. Though this element of negotiation is
important in itself, its presence should not obscure the critical
fact that the undisputed basis for the negotiated rating is the fact
statement prepared by the enforcement subject, a statement whose
assumptions and factual accuracy are not subjected to review at
either the county or state level.
Subjects of enforcement are also, under a related transfer of authority, given responsibility for the initial design of
timetables for compliance with emission standards. The role of
compliance schedules in the enforcement process is similar to
that of environmental ratings in the prescription process: just as
an environmental rating proposed by an enforcement subject represents its conclusion as to a reasonable environmental rat,
ing, the compliance schedule, also proposed by the enforcement
subject, represents its view of the most reasonable timing for
83. See supra pp. 12-14.
84. Though the rating is subsequently forwarded to the central office of the
Environmental Conservation Department for rcview, the last cffective review is in fact
made in the regional office.
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enforcement within outside limits set by the county. As a matter
of timing, the effect of the compliance schedule is to replace the
law's explicit requirement that enforcement and compliance be
nearly contemporaneous-that where the subject deviates from
his emission standard, the agency's enforcement of, and the subject's compliance with, the standard will immediately ensuewith a procedure under which enforcement and compliance are
phased. Under this procedure, the subject proposes a schedule
for the installation of control devices, alteration of fuel source,
or other activity designed to restrict emissions to the level required by the environmental rating; the schedule employs the
county-set deadline for attainment of the requirements implicit in the environmental rating and commits the subject to a
staged completion of these activities, with a certain degree of
compliance prescribed for each stage. Thus, enforcement is pre-sumably administered not as the legal structures contemplate,
as a matter of comparing the subject's contaminant emissions,
with the applicable standard or environmental rating but, instead,
as a matter of comparing the subject's progress in implementing
controls with the requirements of his compliance schedule. Nonetheless, health department personnel place the numerous instances of this latter sort of regulation in the same category of enforcement as that to which the considerably less frequent instances of the former sort are assigned.
These transfers of authority from health department to subjects of enforcement are central to the management of air quality
in the Niagara Frontier Region for a number of reasons, the
most prominent of which is the nature of the authority granted:
to find and state operative facts and to apply the law in terms
of environmental ratings and compliance timetables -authority of the sort traditionally vested in administrative agencies
and courts sitting without juries. The county's and the state's
function is to determine whether the fact-finding is patently
flawed and whether the law has been properly applied. Although
there are no formal restrictions on the extent to which the state and
county can review the subject's fact-finding and application of
law, review is effectively limited, particularly in the case of the
fact-finding, by an informal presumption of correctness which
is apparently attached to the subject's report.
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B. The Exercise of Authority
Compliance, as the word is used by enforcement officials and
subjects in the Niagara Frontier Air Quality Region, is two
steps removed from the word as it is ordinarily used. Compliance
in the classic sense means that a subject is meeting the standards
of conduct prescribed by a competent legislative or administrative
body. At one remove from this is the basis for compliance introduced by the environmental ratings and compliance timetables: in this format the subject of enforcement is prescribing
the standards of conduct to be obeyed by it as well as the timing
of obedience, subject, of course, to review by the state and county. Compliance, in the common parlance of Niagara Frontier
air quality management, means neither of these. It means
instead that the subject of enforcement is honestly moving in the
direction of meeting the requirements proposed by him and accepted by the county and state in the environmental ratings and
associated timetable. Compliance is represented by a continuing
effort toward attaining a goal rather than the goal's attainment
itself. Under this formulation, the critical compliance representation to be made by the enforcement subject is not the extent
of his emissions abatement but, rather, the extent of his good
faith. Abatement measures may, indeed, be strong evidence of the
requisite good faith, but they are clearly not the only, or even the
best, evidence. The initiation or planning of an abatement program may, for example, be taken as a token of good faith; one
county official said he would probably find compliance, "if I see
something on the drawing board or a purchase order-these are
signs." Compliance is commonly determined on the basis of even
more subjective or informal judgments s
The extent to which the traditional concept of compliance,
as consonance with a specified set of goals or standards, has become subordinated to the notion of compliance as movement in
85. Consider, for example, these remarks from health officials:
"We listen to their problems, and if we feel they're really trying to correct

their problem, we give them a little leeway.
"It depends often upon their past cooperation-if they are working toward
the goal we help all we can ....

"We realize it will take time. We ask for monthy or quarterly reports. If we
feel they are moving reasonably fast we are satisfied."
About a third of the enforcement personnel explicitly identified intuitive or related subjective factors as their basis for determining whether good faith efforts are being
expended.
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the direction of goals -or standards became dramatically obvious
in December, 1970. The timetables established early in 1970
and throughout 1969 identified January 1, 1971 as their terminal date, the deadline for the subject's installation or modification of facilities to comply with its environmental rating. All of
the subject's control activities were to be phased for completion
on the first of the year. When, early in December 1970, it became clear to enforcement officials and subjects alike that there
would be few completions by January 1, the deadline was "readjusted" to July 1, 1971.s 6
Given a working definition of compliance which stresses subjective qualities-good faith, sincere efforts-rather than objective qualities-comporting with standards or meeting timetables-it is not surprising that county health officials treated as
largely synonymous extensive compliance and excellent cooperation from the subjects of enforcement. Of the several factors
which contribute to the maintenance of the working definition,.
the association between enforcement subject and enforcement
agency in the promulgation of environmental ratings and compliance timetables is probably the most important. A consequence
of its role-to find and initially apply the relevant facts-is that
the enforcement subject is cloaked with legitimacy in terms of the
prescription and enforcement process. More specifically, county
enforcement officials have not been inclined to distinguish between a subject's proposals of factfinding, environmental ratings and compliance timetables on the one hand and his related,
subsequent representations on the other. As a consequence, the
subject's statements respecting its good faith efforts to proceed
with abatement, or the need for these efforts to be delayed, are
given the same credence as are given factfindings, environmental
ratings and timetables. Because, for reasons already explored,
the enforcement agency has an important stake in the credibility
of these last items, the degree of credibility attached is high; because representations as to the subject's efforts are treated on
the same basis as these other items, they are given the same degree
of credence.
Yet, the real interests of the enforcement subject run counter
to the compliance it professes and, even, to any steps at all in the
86. Erie County, N.Y., Dep't of Health, Office of Public Health Education, Air
Pollution Control Status Report (Feb., 1971).
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direction of emissions control. The subject's interests are in delaying, to the extent possible, implementation of the controls or
other techniques required by the compliance timetables and are,
for that reason, at odds with the credibility and good faith attributed to it by the enforcement agencies. Interests in delay produce in the enforcement subject's reports to the enforcement
agency distortions as to the degree of its compliance with the timetable, trivial variations of processes so that a new timetable will
be required, and a net thrust toward postponement of the timetable deadlines.
The reasons for the enforcement subject's interest in delay,
though simple, are contemplated neither in the legal model nor
even in the real model as it is perceived by the enforcement
agencies. The regulations promulgated by both counties make
it clear that the health department's acceptance of proposed environmental ratings or its grant of a certificate of operation do not
irrevocably commit the department to the standards which underlie the ratings or certificate; 7 new standards may be institutedand, consequently, new control devices required-at any time.
And, emission standards applied to any source will appear particularly unstable as long as ambient air quality standards constitute
the basis for their determination; even assuming that the applicable air quality standards remain constant, their maintenance
will, because ambient air quality varies with changes in the industrial complexion of the region and its neighboring areas, require
adjustment in the emissions control standards for sources within the region. Because enforcement subjects recognize that whatever emission control standards they propose will, even if adopted
by the enforcement agencies, nonetheless be unstable, they are
reluctant to commit themselves in the form of capital expenditure
to a control position which may be undercut at any time. Given
a choice between the present system of relatively liberal, but necessarily shifting, standards and a system of stringent standards which
are immediately applicable and assured of a long life, the preference expressed by the enforcement subjects is for the latter.
At least two other factors, the enforcement agency's orientation to public health administration and the available sanctions,
tend to reinforce the compliance mode. Air quality management
87. See supra pp. 12-14.
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functions in Erie and Niagara Counties are for historical, more
than any other, reasons located in the counties' health departments. One of this tradition's effects upon the adoption of a good
faith compliance approach rather than some other method of
operation is that, because they are concerned with problems of
public health and because they are staffed by medical and healthrelated personnel, the health departments have as their governing ideology that actors are ill, not evil, that rehabilitation is preferable to punishment and adjustment preferable to enforcement.
The air quality control divisions, though their tasks are vitally
different from those of their parent health department, have espoused their ideology. The extent to which their personnel follow a medical, rather than a police or other enforcement, model
is evidenced by the language with which they characterize their
jobs and roles. Violations, for example, were commonly called
"problems' and, though most enforcement officials conceived of
themselves as enforcement agents, many added that they were
not really enforcers; in the words of one, "we're all in this together."
Given the inclination of air quality management officials to
the symbols and attitudes of public health, and to accept good
faith efforts as tokens of compliance, the availability of legal
sanctions might appear irrelevant to their task. Though this may
be so, it appears that there are independent reasons for the nonuse of legal sanctions, reasons which lie in the nature of the
sanctions themselves. Two sanctions are available for the violation of an order of the Commissioner of Health: a fine of a
maximum of $100 per day, or sealing-closing-of the offending
facilities. Industry, at least middle and large-sized firms, and
health officials alike claim to view the $100 fine as an inefficient deterrent because it is easily assimilated into the cost of doing business. Sealing, on the other hand, is an inefficient deterrent because its consequences are so severe that it will rarely, if ever,
be applied. Health officials' reluctance to employ the sealing
sanction was traced in some instances to an expressed fear of adverse public reaction over the closing of plants. To some small
extent industries did appear cowed by the threat of sealing; the
incidence of this anxiety decreases relative to increased firm
size.
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C. Audiences: An Introductory Note
The agencies charged with air quality management in the
Niagara Frontier Region are responsive to a number of audiences.18 The most prominent of these, particularly in its effects
upon the agency's conduct of the enforcement program is, of
course, the subject of enforcement. The very conditions which are
responsible for its prominence-complex technology and a consequent reliance upon joint efforts by enforcement agents and
subjects-account in part for the fact that two other audiences,
the judiciary and the public, enjoy only a limited role. It is, for
example, the mutual need of agency and subject for technological
accommodation, together with the relative newness of the laws
which are being applied, which is largely responsible for both
sides' pronounced aversion to the judicial process; they fear that,
upon review, they might not be in a position to advance, or a
court might not adopt, the interpretation of the law's proscription of certain contaminants which they have worked out through
informal bargaining.
The technological complexity of air quality regulation even
more clearly accounts for the absence of vigorous and sustained
participation by the public audience. Yet, though the air quality decision-making process in the two-county region can be described as generally possessing a low visibility, instances do recur
in which the public voice is heard and in which it affects official
decision. The Erie and Niagara County health departments
supplement their environmental ratings and certification programs with a direct enforcement effort aimed at a narrow range
of nuisance-producing contaminants-smoke and particulates
generally. These direct enforcement efforts differ from the ratings
and certifications programs in their limited scale and their measurement and regulation of emissions on the basis of uniform standards promulgated by the county and state agencies without industry assistance. A number of factors, most prominently complaints from members of the public, account for the departments'
selection of smoke and particulates as the contaminants to pro88. The conclusion of this and other studies of governmental agencies involved
with a number of audiences is that broad, uninformed audiences receive symbolic payoffs
while organized, knowledgeable ones receive tangible payoffs. See, e.g., M. EDOLMAN,
THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS, chs. 2-3 (1967); M. LIPSKY, PROTEST IN CrrY POLITCS,

ch. 6 (1969).
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ceed against on a direct enforcement basis. Because these contaminants are the most sensible-dense black smoke, fine black
particles-and because their effects are the most appreciablemurkiness and soiling-they are the most likely to come to the
attention of, and aggrieve, members of the public generally.
The individual complaint process, which is drawn in almost
every case to incidents of smoke and particulate emissions is,
then, in part responsible for the identification of these contaminants as the subject of direct enforcement. s9 In the simplest
sense, the agency is responding to the expressed concern of the
audience to which, as a matter of legal principle, it is responsible. Also, that the enforcement agencies proceed with an enforement, rather than good faith compliance, approach in these
cases is in part attributable to their expectation that they will
be in a position to marshall an identifiable public to their
side should they encounter intransigence on the part of the subject of enforcement.90
Though smoke and particulates are the contaminants most
commonly identified in citizen complaints, other circumstances
contribute to their selection as the objects of direct enforcement.
Three factors which are responsible for the health departments'
reliance upon cooperative efforts with enforcement subjects in
the environmental ratings program are, in the case of these contaminants, absent. To begin with, the technology involved in the
measurement of smoke and particulate emissions and in tracing
them to their sources, is comparatively simple and well within
the health departments' resources. Second, the technology required for the control of these contaminants is also comparatively simple and economical. Third, and as a related matter,
interviews with personnel from industries in the region revealed
that since these two contaminants produce nuisance situations
89. Influence of an indirect nature has been exerted by local citizens' groups
concerned with issues of environmental quality. Though the contaminants identified by
these groups are, to some extent, the same as those identified by individual complainants,
these groups have also expressed concern with management of air quality as it involves
the technologically more complex questions of exotic contaminants and environmental
ratings. The increased sophistication of their concerns and capabilities is attributable
to the educational background of their membership and to their ability to draw upon
the technological resources of the local community, which contains no less than thirteen
universities and colleges.
90. Compare Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process:
Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE LJ. 548 (1960).
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and, as a consequence, may reflect adversely on a company's
public image, there is every possibility that, absent health department enforcement, industry would have voluntarily imposed the necessary controls upon itself.
IV.

CONCLUSION:

LEGAL STRUCTURES FOR OFFICIAL BEHAVIOR

Two major limitations require that this study's conclusions
be particularly modest. First, the nature of the sample and
of the method of inquiry employed indicate the dangers which
would lie in applying generally some of the study's more specific
findings. As compared with other air quality regions throughout the nation, both in terms of industrial complexion and number of operative enforcement agencies, the Niagara Frontier Region is notably uncomplicated. The predominance in the region of heavy industry and of commonplace-particulate and sulphur oxides-rather than exotic emissions, and the fact that
only two counties and three air quality agencies are immediately
involved, suggest that some of the real prescription and enforcement structures discerned in the region may be differently shaped
or absent from other, more complex, regions. Indeed, some of
the dynamics uncovered in this region may even be absent in
other regions which are similar both in industrial complexion
and jurisdictional size and complexity.
The study's second limitation lies in its exclusive concern
with the management of air quality. Ecology's clear lesson, that
decisions respecting one resource, air, for example, will necessarily affect either of the other two resources, water and land, has
in recent years been amplified by the lesson of technology assessment that, since any alteration in structures for environmental
control may trigger an extensive complex of reactions, it should
be preceded by the most careful attention to its implications and
to the available alternatives for action. It is not suggested, then,
that the structures identified by this study are in any way decisive as to how institutions for air quality management should
be formed; they represent only a few of the many available implements whose efficacy should be evaluated in the formulation
and execution of environmental policy.
Yet, the study's limitations should not be exaggerated. Its
conclusions, particularly those concerning the magnetic relationship between authority and available resources, possess some gross

AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT

predictive value for other regulatory contexts in which the conduct to be regulated is technologically complex. The study's central conclusion is that real authority for the prescription and
enforcement of air quality standards is not necessarily distributed according to explicit statutory schemes but, rather, clusters about those institutions which, because they have the requisite
personnel and technological resources, are in the most effective
position to exercise power. Thus, for example, though the 1967 Act
contemplates a system in which authority is systematically distributed among federal, state and local governments, authority
in the Niagara Frontier Region has in fact been distributed unevenly between the counties and the subjects of enforcement;
the latter, which are not even included within the Act's distribution, receive the larger share, and the role of the state and
federal governments is significantly limited. Because the determination and application of emission control standards are complex and individualized tasks, the counties have delegated responsibility for them to the subjects of enforcement which, in technological and personnel resources, possess a relative superiority
in these matters.
If a legislature were to conclude that this allocation of authority is for some reason improper and that the public interest
would be better served by the location of effective responsibility
in governmental enforcement agencies, it could, as one step in
the direction of achieving this objective, introduce legal structures
designed to alter these resource-based patterns. One method might
involve giving agencies sufficient funds for the assembly of staff
and equipment at least eq4ivalent in strength to the enforcement
subject's or, if it were considered uneconomical for enforcement
agencies to duplicate their subject's expenditures, structures
might be introduced which would have the effect of transferring
from the enforcement subject to the enforcement agency control
of, or at least equal access to, the resources needed for the development of enforcement and prescription data, with attendant
costs allocated to either or both.
The 1967 Act also contemplates the formation of patterns
of strong vertical cooperation-between the state and the
counties within a region-and of strong horizontal cooperationbetween the counties within a region. Probably because of the
45
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uneven distribution of personnel and technological resources,
the patterns which have in fact developed are of only some vertical cooperation-between Niagara County and the state-and of
some vertical autonomy-as between Erie County and the stateand of complete horizontal autonomy-as between Erie and Niagara Counties. Since the availability or perceived availability
of resources appears to influence strongly patterns of autonomy
and dependence, their allocation can be employed as one tool for
stimulating dependency or autonomy.
Because resource distribution is not alone the cause of the
present prescription and enforcement patterns, reallocation of
resources or their control is not alone capable of altering these
patterns. To the extent, for example, that the current approach
in 'Erie and Niagara Counties of good faith compliance-invariably accepting the accuracy of a subject's representations on
faith-is a product of public officials' health department affiliations, and consequent orientation to good faith compliance, and
to the extent that it is concluded that direct enforcement would
be superior to the good faith approach, other new structures are
called for. Enforcement authority could, for example, be transferred to institutions which are more closely oriented to an enforcement model or, alternatively, educational programs or incentive systems designed to orient personnel to a different, enforcement outlook could be introduced into the health department's
air pollution control divisions.
Other dynamics, already compared with the legal model
formed under the 1967 Air Quality Act, may at this point be helpfully compared with some of the Act's 1970 amendments. 1 The
major structural changes incorporated by the 1970 amendments lie in their provision for increased federal responsibility
for the prescription and enforcement of air quality standards. The
91. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, codified at
42 U.S.C.A. § 1857 et seq. (Supp. May, 1971). Comparison of the 1970 Amendments with
the discerned fundamental dynamics will indicate both how legal structures can be
designed to respond to the dynamics of official behavior and the significant degree to
which the explicit requirements of federal legislation continue to be divorced from the
realities of official behavior. This latter conclusion forms the basis for a critique of the
federal act only insofar as the real intent behind the federal act is that its explicit require.
ments be effectuated. An entirely different basis for criticism would exist were there a
different real intent behind the federal act, an intent for example that, on the one hand,
the public should be given some evidence of a legislative commitment to the objectives
represented by the act's explicit requirements and, on the other, that the management
effort be dominated by a compliance mode.
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Environmental Protection Agency's role is no longer restricted
to the formulation of air quality criteria, and now includes the
contemporaneous promulgation of air quality standards92-a
function vested in the states under the 1967 Act-and, in certain
instances, the designation of emission control standards9 3-a
function formerly vested almost entirely in the states and delegated by New York State to Erie and Niagara Counties and effectively delegated by the counties to the subjects of enforcement.
The federal enforcement presence is also strengthened under the
1970 amendments, largely through the removal from the thresh4
hold of federal action of a complex maze of consent procedures.
The 1970 amendments respond in some explicit respects
to the implications of resources distribution for the prescription
and enforcement of standards. To the extent of this explicit
response, the amendments represent a decision that the authority
generated by control of these resources should be lodged in
governmental enforcement agencies rather than in enforcement subjects. And the critical authority for formulation of
emission standards, though largely left to the states, is given to the
comparatively resourceful Environmental Protection Agency in
-certain limited situations as a matter of first instance95 and more
extensively in circumstances in which a state fails to act or
acts inadequately.
In a related, but more radical, departure
from the 1967 Air Quality Act's model, the 1970 amendments give
the Environmental Protection Agency authority to require, as
an incident to the formulation of implementation plans and
emissions standards, that subjects of enforcement install and maintain emissions monitoring equipment, keep emissions records,
make reports to the Agency's Administrator on the basis of the
,data developed and allow the Administrator access to the subject's facilities for the purpose of inspecting records and equipment.9 7 With the Administrator's consent, states may develop
Id. § 109.
Id. §§ 110-12.
Id. § 113.
Id. §§ 111-12.
Id. § 110.
Id. § 114 (a). 42 C.F.R. § 420.19 (1971) provides in part:
(a) Each plan shall provide for monitoring the status of compliance with
any rules and regulations which set forth any portion of the control strategy.
Specifically, each plan shall, as a minimum, provide for:
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
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substitute procedures for imposition of this data collection and

reporting function

8

In their location of increased enforcement authority in
the federal government, the 1970 amendments reflect both an
apparent recognition that capacity to enforce is in part a function
of the enforcement agency's resourcefulness, and an apparent objective that enforcement be more effective. Though one consequence of the partial transfer of enforcement authority from the
states to the Environmental Protection Agency would appear to
be attrition of the compliance approach and its temporizing reliance upon good faith efforts by the enforcement subject, the
amendments reintroduce "good faith" as an explicit and critical
statutory determinant for federal enforcement actions." At the
same time, the amendments introduce a structure which, by forming a basis for direct citizen participation in the enforcement process, may, if factors of low visibility enforcement and lack of citizen resources are also diminished, significantly undercut a good
faith compliance approach.'00
(1) Legally enforceable procedures for requiring owners or operators of sta-

tionary sources to maintain records of, and periodically report to the State
information on, the nature and amount of emissions from such stationary
sources and/or such other information as may be necessary to enable the state
to determine whether such sources are in compliance with applicable portions
of the control strategy.

(2) Periodic testing and inspection of stationary sources.
98. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 114, 84 Stat. 1676, codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-9 (Supp. May, 1971).
99. See, e.g., id. § 110 (f) (1):

Prior to the date on which any stationary source or class of moving sources
is required to comply with any requirement of an applicable implementation
plan the Governor of the State to which such plan applies may apply to the
Administrator to postpone the applicability of such requirement to such source
(or class) for not more than one year. If the Administrator determines that(A) good faith efforts have been made to comply with such requirement before such date ....

then the Administrator shall grant a postponement of such requirement.
Compare 42 C.F.R. § 420.15 (c), (d) (1971):
(c) Any compliance schedule extending over a period of 18 or more months
from the date of its adoption shall provide for periodic increments of progress
toward compliance by any affected source(s) or categories of sources.
(d) Except as otherwise provided by Subpart C of this part, neither the
State agency nor a local agency shall grant any variance of, or exception to,
any compliance schedule included in an applicable plan if such variance or
exception will prevent, or interfere with, attainment or maintenance of a
national standard within the time (s) specified pursuant to § 420.10 (b) and (c).
100. See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 304 (a) (0 (1), 81
Stat. 1676, codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857h-2 (Supp. May, 1971).

